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Comparative Theology, Comparative Religion, and 
Hindu-Christian Studies: Ethnography as Method 
Kristin Bloomer 
University of Hawaii 
CONCERNS that likely inspired today's panel 
can be traced textually to the beginnings of 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and to the 
earliest writings of what we now call Hinduism. 
In the field of Hindu-Christian studies, these 
concerns suggest ethnographic approaches that 
are not in themselves new, but which borrow in 
potentially new ways from the methodological 
tool-boxes of anthropology, theology and the 
history of religions. 
A quick perusal of academic journal entries 
over the past twenty years shows growing 
attention to questions such as "What is 
comparative theology?" and "What is the 
comparative study of religion?" (These broad 
questions suggest a sub-question, the topic of 
this panel: "What is Hindu-Christian Studies, 
and how best might we do it?") Reasons for the 
growing attention to such questions about 
comparison are multiple. They include the 
pressures of globalization and, with them, a 
growing market-academic" and popular-for 
studies and stories that deal with phenomena 
related to globalization. Other reasons include a 
healthy self-doubt that has arisen generally in 
the humanities, particularly in the study of 
religion among theologians and historians of 
religion. This self-consciousness arises from at 
least four comers: the loss of objectivity that has 
accompanied postmodernism; a post-colonial 
anxiety regarding the study of non-Western 
religions; a post-Enlightenment concern about 
whether theology, in particular, can or should be 
considered an academic discipline at all, housed 
under the same roof as other, more "scientific" 
disciplines; and some confusion over attempts to 
understand the boundaries of religion itself, 
partiCUlarly since Talal Asad's critique of 
Clifford Geertz, l a matter I will explore shortly. 
F or these and other reasons, both theologians 
(Christian theologians in particular) and 
comparativists have been worrying over who 
they are, what they are doing, and how they can 
be responsibly more responsive to the ever-
"more-impressive fact of religious plurality. 
Before trying to take a stab, first, at defining 
"what" comparative theology might mean today, 
I want to try to understand it historically-
particularly since I agree with Asad that the 
concept "religion" exists only as a historical 
construct/ as does "comparative theology," 
"comparative religion," "Hindu-Christian 
studies," or any term for that matter. Which 
practices and concepts we subsume under 
"religion," or "theology" or "comparative 
theology" depends, of course, on our theories, 
our experience, our worldviews-all of which 
are shaped by discursive processes and events of 
history. To understand something about the 
history of comparative theology, then, will help 
us see: first, how it, like any other term or 
practice, is a historical product of discursive 
processes; how, as such a,product, it is open to 
the force of change; and how theologians and 
scholars of religion-themselves discursive 
subj ects working within the process of such 
change, conditioned by the limits of its history 
and the perceived needs of the moment-can 
best correlate their work to these needs while 
trying to maintain a sense of integrity. 
Kristin C. Bloomer is an Assistant Professor of Religion at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. Her 
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In a 1987 Encyclopedia of Religion article 
under the heading "Theology: Comparative 
Theology," David Tracy points out that although 
the work of comparative religion goes back to 
our very beginnings as humans-at least as far 
back as the moment when the first worshipper of 
a god or gods asked herself why her neighbor is 
a worshipper of some other god or gods-
comparative work of any sustained scholarly 
fashion goes back, in traditional Western 
theologies and philosophies, at least as far as the 
beginnings of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 3 
Among other traditions, especially in India, 
Tracy points out, the scholarly work of religious 
comparison has been going on much longer still 
and with great philosophical sophistication 
(Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian 
Philosophy, 5 vols., Cambridge, 1922-1955). 
Despite the rich history of philosophical and 
theological scholarly work in India and the 
vibrant theological work being carried out there 
as well as in other countries and traditions, one 
of the greatest problems with the term 
"theology" today is that it is still generally 
assumed to mean "Christian, Western theology," 
at least within the confines of the Western 
academy. For the purposes of this paper, both 
because of and in spite of this tendency-and for 
reasons of space-I will focus on the history of 
comparison within Christianity. Furthermore, 
while theologies of Islam, Hinduism and 
Buddhism (though some Buddhist philosophical 
treatises might better be described as a-
theologies) have contributed significantly to the 
formation of Christian theologies, it is Christian 
theology that has most directly influenced the 
forination of the academic study of religion in 
the so-called West. 
While the term "comparative theology" has 
received a fair amount of cache in recent years, 
Christian theology, I would argue (along with 
others such as David Tracy, Keith Ward, Francis 
X .. Clooney, Eric Sharpe), has always been 
comparative. Furthermore, it has always 
struggled to define itself in relation to other 
disciplines, and with the notion of how 
scientifically or normatively neutral it can or 
should be. Tracy reminds us in his 
Encyclopedia of Religion entry that while the 
term "comparative theology" was not used in the 
premodern period, comparative elements-that 
is, reflection on "other religions"-have been 
present in the Christian tradition since its 
beginnings, both in the philosophical traditions 
of Greece and Rome and in the Hebrew 
traditions of ancient Israel. These comparative 
elements can be traced in leanings both positive 
(in terms of borrowing) and negative 
(exclusivism, tendencies to demonize).4 
The emergence of the very notion of religion 
in Europe, furthermore, has been outlined by 
Talal Asad, Eric Sharpe, .and Samuel J. Preus, 
whose book Explaining Religion: Criticism and 
Theory from Bodin to Freud traces a narrative of 
displacement in which religion as it is studied in 
the human sciences is increasingly separated 
from theology. Denying the possibility of 
transcendence arid replacing it with a naturalistic 
paradigm, scholars of religion increasingly 
adopted a critical outlook towards their object of 
study and removed from it any appeal to a 
transcendent God. Key players in this paradigm 
shift as Preus lists them are Bernard Fontenelle, 
David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Emile Durkheim, E.B. Tylor, 
and Sigmund Freud, among others. 
Of these men, Schleiermacher, a Reformed 
theologian, is particularly key to the 
development of the study of religion as a human 
science-or particularly, at least, for theology. 
Theologians such as Keith WardS, James 
Fredericks6 and others have pointed out the 
extent of Schleiermacher's influence on the 
contemporary, comparative study of religion, 
particularly on liberal theology and its claim to a 
universal religious experience. 
Schleiermacher's apparent appeal to a universal 
core linking together all religions, first (On 
Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, 
1799) in the sense of an intuition, sense or 
feeling of the infinite/ and in later writings 
(Glaubenslehre, or The Christian Faith, 1821) 
as a feeling of absolute dependence,8 has been 
used as a basis for arguing for the 
"transcendental unity" of all religions-an 
argument which has been shown to be highly 
problematic. Nonetheless, this transcendental 
unity has served, as a cornerstone for much 
modem thought about religion and can be seen 
in works of authors including Rudolph Otto, 
Ernst Troeltsch, Mircea Eliade, Bernard 
Lonergan, Huston Smith, Wilfred Cantwell 
-
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Smith, and John Hick, among many others. It is 
an argument appreciable for its contribution to 
the comparative study of religions in its stress on 
similarity (without which one cannot do 
comparison), but one also which is due 
refutation, along with many other contemporary 
scholars of religion, for failing properly to 
recognize distinction. 
About half a century after Schleiermacher 
published Glaubenslehre, "comparative 
religion," or what came to be known as the 
historical, critical and comparative study of 
religions of the world, . came into wide public 
attention. This coincided, in the l860s and 70s, 
with the rise of empiricism and the new "science 
of religion.,,9 Friedrich Max Muller, the 
expatriate German philologist and man of letters, 
famously introduced the discipline "Science of 
Religion" on February 19, 1870 in an address to 
the Royal Institution in London. This "science," 
as opposed to the "science of theology" outlined 
by Thomas Aquinas half a millenium earlier, 
was to be significantly different from theology. 
Notably, Muller did not use the terms 
"theology" or "comparative theology" anywhere 
in his address. Rather, his use of the word 
"science" seemed to suggest a study of religion 
that would analyze historical forms of religion 
as opposed to theoretic theology, which Tracy 
defines as an analysis of the philosophical 
conditions of the possibility for a religion.10 The 
work of David Hume or G.W.F. Hegel would 
exemplify the latter type of theology.ll 
Alternately, in 1871, on the heels of Muller's 
address, James Freeman Clarke published Ten 
Great Religions: An Essay in Comparative 
Theology, which concentrated on the history of 
religious doctrines in different traditions. 
A scholar attempting to do comparative 
theology from within a historical approach - that 
is to say, from within a history of religions 
approach - may still theorize a systematic meta-
structure through which she analyzes two or 
more religions. One difference between her and 
a theoretical theologian or a theologian of 
religion(s), however, is that she, the historian, 
may be more inclined to work without making 
her (sometimes latent) religious or a-religious 
standpoint explicit, or without necessarily 
revealing the religious underpinnings of her 
supposedly neutral hermeneutical categories-
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though she may acknowledge her intellectual 
debts to preceding scholars of religion or locate 
herself in a particular school of scientific 
thought (anthropological, sociological, 
psychological, etc.). The hermeneutic or 
methodological categories employed by the 
comparativist working from a history of 
religions approach may, like those employed by 
the comparativist working from within a 
theology of religion(s), encourage the judgment 
of one religion as lacking in relation to another, 
as less "doctrinally developed," for example, or 
as less symbolically rich. The categories she 
employs may leave certain forms of religion 
outside the field of comparison altogether. 
The most recent, famous example 
highlighting the potential.blind spots of such an 
approach was outlined by Asad in his critique of 
Geertz's definition of religion as a cultural 
system. 12 In a one-two-three combo punch, Asad 
first criticized Geertz for unwittingly 
constructing his definition out of features 
bearing an uncanny likeness to his own cultural-
religious background (the jab: white 
Protestantism). Second, he critiqued Geertz for 
projecting a distinctly modem, post-
Enlightenment bias regarding the ess"ential 
nature of religion as something separate, 
distinguishable or able to be teased out from 
other aspects of life-such as aesthetics, history, 
science, the quotidian. Third, he revealed some 
of the historical shifts and discursive processes 
that have contributed to the production of our 
concept of religion as a trans-historical essence. 
Asad explored the processes by which this 
concept came to seem natural, through the 
effects of discipline and power in medieval 
Christianity and Islam. "My argument," Asad 
wrote, "is that there cannot be a universal 
definition of religion, not only because its 
constituent elements and relationships are 
historically specific, but because that definition 
is itself the historical product of discursive 
processes.,,13 If this was true, many scholars of 
religion were down for the count. 
Though perhaps not the full count. 
Many scholars mulled, while lying on their 
backs: How do I proceed without universal 
defmitions?-and got up again. Bruce Lincoln, 
in his Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion 
After September 11, commented that while the 
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second part of Asad's above statement was 
"wonderfully insightful," the reasons for the 
absolute prohibition in the fIrst part-that there 
cannot be a universal defInition of religion-
were not entirely clear. "Is not all language 'the 
historical product of discursive processes?" 
Lincoln asked. 14 That this is the case "hardly 
renders futile all attempts at defmition, 
... particularly when one understands these as 
provisional attempts to clarify one's thought, not 
to capture the innate essence of things.,,15 In 
other words, a defInition or a methodology 
based on proposed universals may be useful to 
forward a position from a particular 
standpoint-and then, perhaps, to move on to 
another position. 
Despite some of the working benefIts of 
forthrightly assuming an underlying unity of 
religious experience-including the benefIt of 
providing a common ground for discussion that 
can encourage interreligious dialogue-the 
analytical disadvantages are, I believe, more 
signifIcant. Asserting a unifIed fIeld of religious 
experience can actually discourage dialogue and 
corrode critical scholarship. Other problems 
include the promotion of a subtle (or not-so-
subtle) theological and/or political imperialism, 
or the support of an uncritical syncretism that 
obscures real differences. In response to these 
problems I agree with Fredericks, who pits his 
own defInition of a proper way to do 
comparative theology against a liberal theology 
of religions, arguing that comparative theology 
must deal responsively and creatively with the 
plurality of religions, as opposed to a 
comprehensive theology of non-Christian 
religions based on an appeal to universal 
religious experience. 
On the other hand, I want to avoid the 
extreme reaction to liberal theology as offered 
by the cultural-linguistic position advocated by 
George Lindbeck and other "postliberal 
theologians." Lindbeck's position, which 
explicitly draws on the semiotic anthropology of 
Clifford Geertz, proposes that religion is a like a 
language, with its own rules of grammar, that 
forms a perceptual and conceptual framework 
for shaping subjectivities. The grammar of this 
religion, Lindbeck argues, is doctrine. Doctrines 
change, Lindbeck asserts, not as a result of new 
experiences that spring ex nihilo out of a 
changing autonomous subject, but as a result of 
the interactions of a cultural-linguistic system 
with changing situations. Religious traditions 
are transformed when a religious interpretive 
scheme develops anomalies as it is applied in 
new historical or cultural contexts. 16 
The experiential-expressivist model 
forwarded by liberal theologians-called such 
because of its roots in the idea that all religion is 
the expression of a shared, underlying 
experience-suggests that "the various religions 
are diverse symbolizations of one and the same 
core experience of the Ultimate, and that 
therefore they must respect one another, learn 
from one another, and reciprocally enrich one 
another.,,17 The cultural-linguistic model, on the 
other hand; 'locuses on particular religions as 
separate language systems. These systems may 
perchance be commensurable-their doctrinal 
similarities may happen to overlap in places-
but as a whole they are not various expressions 
of a shared, unifIed core experience. Rather, the 
cultural linguistic model "stresses the degree to 
which human experience is shaped, molded, and 
in a sense constituted by cultural and linguistic 
forms.,,18 As a result, adherents of different 
religions do not diversely thematize the same 
experience; they have different experiences.19 
The advantages of such a model-cultural 
particularity, historical specifIcity, analytical 
precision, agreement with recent theories of 
language-are evidenced by the scholarly 
ascendancy the model has enjoyed among 
historians, anthropologists, sociologists and 
philosophers. The disadvantages, however, 
remain signifIcant. How can a person who has 
been trained to embody the skills of one 
particular religion via its doctrinal rules ever 
truly understand the embodied skills of another? 
Even if this is possible, the idea that each 
religion constitutes a world of its own and 
uniquely forms human experience might make 
theologians confronted with the daunting task of 
navigating a new world feel safer turning 
inward, into the world of their home religion. 
They might turn to ecumenical dialogue-if the 
theologian is Christ~an, say, to dialogue between 
Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox 
Christians-rather than to inter-religious 
dialogue or comparison, say, with Hindus or 
Hinduism. While such dialogue and comparison 
, 
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might happen ad hoc, and while points of 
intersection between religions may indeed be 
found to exist in these moments, the job of the 
theologian working under such a model is not 
thought to be one of inter-religious comparison. 
A cultural-linguistic model generally functions 
"intratextually," that is, within its own 
interpretive framework. Christians, according to 
this scheme, end up talking mainly to 
themselves.· The same goes for Buddhists or 
Hindus, etc. 
While I am drawn to this cultural-linguistic 
model for its attention to cultural and doctrinal 
specificity, I am concerned about the 
implications of its most extreme versions for 
inter-religious dialogue, scholarly understanding 
and comparison. At the same time, the model 
offers a helpful tool to avoid an equally 
dangerous liberal approach that suggests one 
unified, universal experience of religion. 
One way out of the quandary of trying to 
understand the religion of the Other is to limit 
the scope of one's project, slow way down, and 
take serious stock. Scholars may suggest, along 
with Fredericks, Francis X. Clooney, S.J., and 
others trained within the Chicago history of 
religions tradition, that all academic exercises 
are tentative, and that comparative experiments 
may lead to particularly "limited, very tentative 
results. ,,20 Instead of offering encompassing 
theological theories based on claims for or 
against a universal religious experience, 
Fredericks suggests that the comparative 
theologian engage in "limited case studies in 
which specific elements of the Christian 
tradition are interpreted in comparison with 
elements of another religious tradition.,,21 He 
bases this suggestion on the belief that a fully 
systematized theology of non-Christian religions 
is not possible. 
I am drawn to Fredericks' notion of limited 
case studies, as well as to another interpretation 
of the term "comparative theology" forwarded 
by Clooney - with a twist. Clooney's approach 
could be seen to merge both uses of 
"comparative theology" noted by Tracy-that 
which might be considered part of the history of 
religions approach, and that which might be 
called explicitly theological. Clooney calls for 
"a truly constructive theology ... distinguished 
by its SOU1;ces and ways of proceeding, by its 
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foundation in more than one tradition ... and by 
reflection which builds on that foundation, rather 
than simply on themes or by methods. already 
articulated prior to the comparative practice.,,22 
This third type of theology, Clooney argues, is 
"a theology deeply changed by its attention to 
the details of multiple religious and theological 
traditions; it is a theology that occurs truly only 
after comparison. ,,23 
But not entirely after, I would' argue. 
"After," while gesturing in the right direction, 
suggests a stopping point for comparison, 
following which the theological task begins. 
Clooney acknowledges in theory that this is true, 
but that there is "no time limit, no boundary 
marker" necessitated by the word "after:" 
'" After' also implies consequence, 'in 
accordance with,'" and may also suggest an on-
going q~ality to the work of comparison, 
Clooney writes.24 Perhaps, then, we might 
acknowledge the existence of "an ever-
evolving" theology or standpoint in relation to 
notions of divinity, transcendence, and the 
metaphysical - a theological standpoint that is 
modified and brought into existence only 
through dialogical study. This dialogue occurs 
only in relation-not only between real scholars 
but also between real people living in real, 
specific, historical situations. We are now 
beginning to point toward ethnography. 
One might infer from Clooney's stress on 
"the constructive" element of the project that the 
difference is one of identity as well as audience: 
whereas an historian of religion could see herself 
contributing to (and therefore acting 
constructively toward) the field of history, the 
theologian could see herself as standing in the 
stream of a particular way of talking about 
divinity, or god(s), or ultimate reality-even if 
she herself makes no appeal to the existence of a 
transcendental being beyond this stream of talk. 
She may seek to inquire into the ways selves (or, 
in certain cases, no-selves) are created and 
molded by the words, concepts and practices of 
their home tradition. As she compares this home 
world with other cultural-linguistic worlds, or 
with various expressions of her own tradition in 
various historical and cultural moments, she may 
inquire into how, if at all, other selves (or no-
selves, for the term "self' is a particularly 
Western one) are molded differently. She may 
1 
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see herself as standing in the stream of a 
particular religious tradition that she considers 
home-though she may travel in search of new 
analytic tools and hermeneutic horizons, with an 
awareness that the language of home is 
sometimes lacking. She may understand herself 
to be speaking primarily to those who identify 
with that home tradition, perhaps to those who 
feel restless within it, or to those few who pay 
attention to the work of scholars of religion-
whether those' people are academics or people 
trying to make sense of their own and others' 
lives. She may rely heavily upon the tools of 
history of religion(s) or area studies, and may 
seek to change a small public's understanding of 
home andlor foreign traditions via these tools. 
She may refrain from making appeals to the 
existence of a transcendent being; she may talk 
more about the humans who engage in god-talk 
than in talk about a god or gods. In the end, her 
position may be more one of advocacy than one 
of neutrality or pretended neutrality-advocacy 
for change in the academy, or for a wider 
awareness regarding difference and similarity at 
,home. 
It is this, third sort of comparative 
theology-a constructive sort as defined by 
Clooney, with valences of Tracy's first model 
within the history of religions-that appeals to 
me most. This sort of comparative work, I 
believe, has the potential to be most creative in 
its openness to a variety of traditions, to the 
possibility of changing not only the lens through 
which one looks at those traditions, but also to 
the possibility of changing the lens through 
which one looks back at the home tradition. It 
points, finally, to a form of theological and 
intellectual practice in which the subject 
performing the task of scholarship is explicitly 
open to change resulting from that study. 
The "how:" methods 
While this third, constructive approach 
seems to me best in describing the "what" of 
comparative theology (particularly if we view it 
as building on the approach most indebted to the 
history of religions), I would at the same time 
distinguish my methods from the type of 
comparative theology that has been so 
productively forwarded by Clooney. For one 
thing, while recognizing the constructed, fluid 
nature of cultures and traditions, Clooney 
confines his work to traditions as defined by 
texts. Second, I want to push the boundaries of 
fairly simple notions of comparison that rely on 
the idea of traditions as discrete entities rather 
than cultural negotiations with syncretic 
characteristics, negotiations that are fluid, 
changing, pelmeable, informed by one another. I 
am less inclined, for example, to compare texts 
from two different traditions, A and B, rather 
than look at how each text is a complicated 
construction of, say, Acd or Bqj, or Ab and Ba. 
How has A been constructed in part through 
interaction with B, andlor with readers or 
devotees of B? What are the implications of 
such considerations for comparative theology? 
Furthermore, while during the past ten. to 
fifteen years, scholars have produced an 
increasing number of studies that may be labeled 
"comparative theology," nearly all the work 
being done in that area-studies not only by 
Clooney but also David Burrell, Joseph Bracken, 
Jacques Dupuis, Mark Heim and Keith Ward, 
for example-falls into the category of 
systematic or philosophical theology. Using only 
philosophical or systematic theological methods 
for a project in comparative theology presents 
many problems. First, it fails properly to address 
those oral or poetic traditions that deal not in the 
written word or in logical argument, but ~ 
speech, song, narrative, metaphorical language 
andlor myth (though Clooney has done this). 
Second, it fails to consider the role of practice in 
religion, particularly by practitioners who are 
unaware of or uninterested in doctrine, or who 
actively participate in traditions that have no 
explicit doctrine. 
If neither philosophical nor systematic 
theology necessarily serves as the best method 
for comparative theological work, which 
subdisciplines or methods do? And still, even if 
we choose ethnography, how do we avoid the 
pitfalls of universalism on the one hand, and, on 
the other, of getting so caught up in differences 
or radical particularizing that we make 
comparison imposs,ible? 
With regards to the latter problem, Wendy 
Doniger suggests a method constructed from the 
bottom up-that is, one which "assumes certain 
continuities not about overarching human 
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universals but about particular narrative details 
concerning the body, sexual desire, procreation, 
parenting, pain, and death, details which, though 
unable to avoid mediation by culture entirely, 
are at least less culturally mediated than the 
broader conceptual categories of the 
universalists.,,25 Working around these bodily 
points, Doniger continues, the scholar working 
from the bottom up will "lean more heavily on 
data, informed, even inspired though she may be 
by theory; she begins with a thorough historical 
study and then goes back to make it 
comparative.,,26 While the scholar will be 
limited by the confines of her own linguistic and 
cultural background, she will try to master the 
language(s) of the other and pay attention to her 
sources on their own terms, in all their 
complexity, before she pays attention to a 
particular rubric or meta-narrative for 
interpretation. She will not work from the top 
down, as from a "transcendental concept" of 
religion, nor from some universalist theory of 
religion, but from the ground up: from what the 
texts andlor people in the field say. The 
scholar's own culture and life experiences will 
influence her interests and motivating idea-
what Doniger calls the "third side" of the 
triangle, with the other two emanating from the 
two traditions or situations being compared-but 
that idea will lead her back to the texts, or to the 
field, "where she may find unexpected details 
that will in turn modify the idea she is looking 
for.,,27 
Obviously, one cannot simply jump into a 
text or the field and receive, as. if through 
osmosis or revelation, knowledge of data "on its 
own terms" or of things "as they are." One will 
always be interpreting. Doniger's approach 
continues to raise questions: Which bottom (or 
whose?), and what kind of up? Does one ever 
really reach the bottom? The answers to the first 
two questions depend, as Doniger herself 
acknowledges, on the scholar as well as on the 
data. If we take "the bottom" to mean the 
experience and world view of practitioners 
operating within a cultural-linguistic rule-game 
that is different from ours, we can never get 
there, no matter how nuanced our linguistic 
competence, cultural-historical knowledge, or 
empathic skills. Indeed, contemporary linguistic 
and literary theory suggests that we can never 
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truly know the referent, the thing-in-itself, in an 
unmediated fashion, let alone the thing as named 
and experienced by another. 
Still, one can try to understand; one can try 
to approximate another's meaning. One may 
never gain fluency in another language, for 
example, but one may gain significant ground in 
getting one's (message across, or in 
understanding what another is trying to tell you. 
The more one understands about another person 
and th~ir world-the world they are from, the 
world they are in the process of constructing, the 
world they imagine, and the world they imagine 
you to be from-the better one's chances of 
building not solipsisms, but meaningful 
connection, in which one's world of meaning-
building is influenced by another's and vice-
versa. Still, the question remains: how best to. 
try? 
The "bottom-up" method that I propose 
happens to coincide with a developing trend 
within academic theology called "theologies of 
the people"-a growing subdiscipline that can 
well serve that of comparative theology,· and 
vice versa. "Theologies of the people," which 
shows the influence of cultural studies, Marxist 
studies and anthropology, has been defmed by 
Kathryn Tanner to mean "theologies without 
much textual or even extended verbal expression 
which are simply found, more often than not, 
fully imbedded in the religious practices and 
lived relations of those who, with reference to 
intellectual training, social standing, economic 
attainment or institutional position, cannot be 
counted among the elites of church and 
society. ,,28 
Tanner relies on theories of popular culture 
to "flesh out" conceptually this evolving project. 
Theories of popular culture, she argues, serve to 
elevate the commonly ignored religious beliefs 
and practices of ordinary and marginalized 
peoples to a level of equal importance to 
Christian theological "classics," while likewise 
showing that many of the characteristics of 
popular theology also hold for theologies 
produced by educated and religious elites. 
"Theologies of the people" therefore, when used 
in conjunction with 'cultural theory, can "bring 
down" traditional theology to the level of 
popular theology, while "raising" popular 
theology to the level traditional theology has 
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thus far enjoyed. Showing all theologies to be 
cultural constructions "levels" the playing field 
among them. 
It does not, however, address the problem of 
finding the "bottom." The economic bottom, 
with all that it entails-illiteracy, 
disenfranchisement, etc.-is no closer to the 
hermeneutical bottom than the privileged, 
literate bottom is. The "otherness" of the culture 
in both cases remains a barrier.29 However, by 
including different economic and cultural cross-
sections in a study and analyzing the constructed 
nature of them all, one can try to complicate 
matters; one can attempt to work against reified 
assumptions that either "the bottom" or "the top" 
is any closer to something called "The Truth." 
One can, furthermore, invite new questions for 
analysis and include new voices and 
perspectives in the mix. Finally, one can try to 
be clear about (or figure out) one's own 
standpoint in the process. 
Philosophy as a tool to this project is less 
relevant than, say, anthropology, cultural studies 
or the human and social sciences in generaL Yet 
ethnographic approaches have not been widely 
applied to the comparative theological field-
which is paradoxical, considering the long 
tradition of ethnography in the history of 
religions. One of the reasons for this lack is the 
tendency within theology to consider texts, not 
people, as authoritative sources for theological 
reflection. One could trace in this tendency an 
aversion, imbedded within the power structures 
of many traditions, to recognize sources of 
"revelation" or authority outside the power 
centers of that tradition-as in the discourses of 
people on the margins, for example, who may 
have controversial things to say about a given 
tradition, or who engage in practices that may 
not be conside~ed orthodox. 
And yet, to remain viable and relevant-in 
fact, to continue to exist at all-theology as 
produced by educated elites has also always 
attempted at least some popular appeaL 
Theologies of classically trained clergy were 
directed, from the very beginnings of 
Christianity, to a very wide audience. 
Theologians today are as aware of the academic 
or even popular market as they are, perhaps, of 
their denominational affiliation. Relying on the 
cultural theory of Stuart Hall, Tanner states that 
"[j]ust as popular cultural production occurs in 
and through a tensive relationship with elite 
culture, so elite cultural production often exists 
in and through a tensive relation with popular 
culture.',3o Indeen, elite theology is parasitic, 
"living off the host cultures that it finds and does 
not produce.,,31 And yet, those "host cultures" 
are in part parasitic of and produced by the elite 
culture-in this case, elite theology. Both elite 
and non-elite cultures (though recent'theories of 
popular culture problematize sharp distinctions 
between the two) produce and are produced in a 
tension-filled relation with one another. They 
exist (as we have likewise seen in our history of 
comparative religion, above) only within this 
relation. 
As Tanner has shown, a "theologies of the 
people" approach works against the notion that 
theological and Christian identity must be kept 
separate from accommodation with the 
languages and practices of non-biblical/non-
theological realms of experience. She argues 
that there is no way to distinguish something 
called Christian culture from the non-Christian 
by virtue of its content, although biblical or 
doctrinal sources may certainly clue one into 
whether a culture might be called Christian. In 
this light, conservative, neo-orthodox and post-
liberal theologies that define something called 
culture (or Christian discourse) as a fixed 
impermeable entity make no sense. Tanner 
exposes postmodernism's effects on modem 
ideas of culture through its critique of holism: 
the notion that cultures are cohesive wholes held 
together by shared beliefs, symbol Systems, or 
rituals that have a unidirectional causal force. 
Postmodern thought, with its attention to 
fragments, fluidity and the constructed nature of 
reality, has critiqued this idea of holism, along 
with the idea that cultures are closed systems, 
identical to social groups, or that the activities of 
a culture are held together by the inner core 
beliefs of its members.32 
Such a critique is consistent with the work 
of James Clifford, an historian of anthropology 
who understands culture as emergent and 
contested. To Clifford, cultures and traditions 
are not natural,' coherent wholes, but re-
negotiated ensembles of diversity. These 
ensembles are not given, but made, through a 
process of collective, value-laden negotiation?3 
r 
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Delwin Brown, in an article about theology and 
the "new ethnography," points out the radically 
theological nature of. Clifford's concept of 
"refashioning" in the way that "the self ... called 
into question is not simply a carefully protected 
professional fayade with its assorted techniques 
and histories, but a person. . . . At least in 
Clifford's analysis, what is subject to being torn, 
negotiated, co-created,reconstructed, and 
refashioned is the fabric of the whole self, 
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